Carnal Reason

I want to continue my criticism of some remarks by Michael Novak, so it seems appropriate to explain my animus.

I ran across the remarks in question by accident. Recently Heather Mac Donald wrote an article in The American Conservative concerning the place of atheists within the conservative movement. Somewhere I read that Mr Novak had made some apposite remarks in a piece at First Times. There I read the following:

I would hope that my earlier blogs—read here, here, and here—have made clear the kinship I feel with serious atheists. I am certain (from experience) that we walk very much in the same night.

I followed the links; the third one is again my subject. Contrary to what I expected from Mr Novak’s claim of kinship with serious atheists, I found his remarks both condescending and misrepresentative of serious atheistic thought.

One reason I have often encountered for not believing in the God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Jesus runs like this: As long as there is even one orphaned child, who uncomprehendingly sobs alone in the dark, I will not accept a God who permits such a world to exist. I refuse.

Another reason I have heard is this: Any God who would throw human beings into unmitigated torture in hell for all eternity, just because of a minor infraction of some silly taboo, is a being to despise, not to accept.
…
To return to the two reasons for unbelief given above: The first is a rather odd one. The inquirer assumes a position of moral superiority to God, as a person more intelligent, more pure, more noble, more compassionate. It suggests that the inquirer cares more about the child sobbing in the dark than that child’s Creator and Father does. That would certainly be odd.

Mr Novak’s presentation of the first reason is exceptionally weak. The sobbing orphan is still alive, and much worse things happen to children than the death of parents. If the reader will indulge me, I have presented a somewhat more pointed version of the argument, here.

Not content to present an inadequate version of the atheist’s argument, Mr Novak then begs the question by faulting the atheist for fancying himself more pure, more noble, more compassionate than God. The atheist does no such thing. Rather, he argues that beings who are both benevolent and omnipotent would not countenance atrocities against children. Given that manifest atrocities occur, it follows that no benevolent omnipotent being exists.

Posted on August 22nd, 2006 by pwyll
Filed under: religion