Carnal Reason

James Arlandson has begun a several part series on miracles in the American Thinker. The first three installments are Miracles and New Testament Studies, Hume’s Miracle Prison: How They Got Out Alive, and Fortifying Hume’s Miracle Prison (2): Miracles and Historical Testimony.

Mr Arlandson’s purpose is to rescue the possibility of the miraculous from philosophical skepticism. Arlandson writes:

For such philosophers [Hume and Voltaire], then, the world we live in is a closed natural system of cause and effect. Thus, when reports of miracles are written, such as the Virgin Birth found in the New Testament, then we ask this question: Which is more probable? Did the early church uncritically accept legends abounding in the Greco-Roman world, or did the miracle happen? A rationalist accepts the first option as more probable.

Mr Arland blames Scottish philosopher David Hume for destroying widespread belief in the possibility of miracles. He summarizes Hume’s arguments against the miraculous, as follows. The inner quotations are from Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.

Why is Hume so skeptical? Witnesses for the defense and their testimonies are not good or strong enough, but compared to what? Simple. All miracles violate our firm and unalterable experience that establishes the laws of nature.

A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. (p. 114)

A miracle may be accurately defined [as] a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent. (p. 115, note 1, emphasis original)

Thus, no person, even if he has the utmost integrity and honesty, can overturn by his testimony the laws of nature established by firm and unalterable experience.

Hume uses, as it were, a two-sided scale, like the scales of justice on the outside of the Supreme Court building. On one side he places our firm and unalterable experience with the laws of nature; on the other he places the reliable testimony for miracles. The first side is always heavier or wins the contest. This is why he could establish the witnesses and testimonies (in the bulleted lists) with such confidence, proclaiming their veracity. But firm and unalterable experience establishing the laws of nature must by the very nature of the case always outweigh the testimonial evidence for miracles. “A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence” (p. 110).
So how does Arlandson propose to refute Hume? He charges Hume with circular reasoning:

However, Hume’s stacked deck against miracles begs the question or goes in circles. This fallacy means that the answer to a question is found in the premises or in the front end of the investigation. We assume the answer before we inquire into it. His super-high definition of a miracle does this (it violates the laws of nature established by firm and unalterable experience). He is trying to determine whether miracles can occur, but he slams shut the prison doors on them before they can make their appeal, not to mention while they were on trial.

The words firm and especially unalterable are the crux of the fallacy. How do we know that miracles cannot occur? Because they “violate” or “transgress” the laws of nature that are established by firm and unalterable experience. But why cannot our experience with the laws of nature be “violated” on occasion? Because that would be a miracle. And they don’t happen because of our firm and unalterable experience establishes the laws of nature.

Next, Hume’s definition of a miracle is so stringent that no historical or empirical investigation will possibly argue the case for miracles. To repeat the circular argument, why are no multiple honest and reliable testimonies in favor of miracles acceptable? Because the laws of nature are firmly and unalterably established by experience. The testimonies are ipso facto less accurate and less probable, no matter what. Therefore, no testimonies whatsoever for the defense will open the prison doors, because they are permanently locked in advance, no key existing to open them.

C. S. Lewis describes the circularity:

Now we must agree with Hume that if there is absolutely “uniform experience” against miracles, if in other words they have never happened, why then they never have. Unfortunately we know the experience against them to be uniform only if we know that all the reports of them are false. And we can know all the reports to be false only if we know already that miracles have never occurred. In fact we are arguing in a circle.

I prefer the brevity of Lewis’ argument. Let’s consider it by analogy to another quixotic quest, the search for a perpetual motion engine. The perpetual motion machine is as sought after as the fountain of youth, and as often found. Hidebound conventional physicists will tell you that such device would violate the laws of thermodynamics. They would point out that there is absolutely “uniform experience” against perpetual motion. The perpetual motion crank can reply that “we know the experience against them to be uniform only if we know that all the reports of them are false. And we can know all the reports to be false only if we know already that perpetual motion has never occurred. In fact we are arguing in a circle”.

But the circle can be broken. Produce the machine, or produce the miracle. No, that is too hard. Better to insist that the onus of proof is on the skeptic. He must account for every event in all of time and space, else how can he know whether experience is in fact uniform? This line of argument opens the door not just for miracles, but for anything and everything whatsoever.

Arlandson (momentarily) takes a more conciliatory stance.

It is possible that scholars would suggest that I am not being fair to Hume here. It is not clear that he is begging the question. If he simply claims that since the evidence for the laws of nature is always greater than the evidence for a miracle, and since the two bodies of evidence inevitably conflict, then we are never justified in accepting reports of miracles.

Exactly. Hume’s point concerns epistemology, not metaphysics. He does not set out to demonstrate that miracles are impossible. He makes the more subtle point that there is very little reason to believe accounts of miracles. Imagine that a dozen or so commercial fishermen return from a fishing trip and announce that a crew member was killed while at sea. Miraculously, he came back to life, which explains his current robust health. Why on earth should anyone believe such a story?

Some claim to have experienced miracles, and others claim to have constructed perpetual motion machines. Some claim to have seen ghosts, or to have been abducted by aliens. Is it special pleading to suggest that these claims almost certainly false? The onus of proof falls on the person making incredible claims.

[tags]miracles, skepticism[/tags]

Posted on December 31st, 2006 by pwyll
Filed under: religion